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 In April 1877 Wade Hampton, III, Confederate military hero and, now political “savior,” 
declared to a Columbia crowd on his return from Washington that they should “…forget 
we are Democrats or Republicans, white or colored, and remember only that we are 
South Carolinians.” Although Hampton may have used some political hyperbole to 
soothe a fractious electorate, the now undisputed governor of the Palmetto State, wanted 
to convince the white Democracy that blacks, most of them former slaves, should be 
allowed to participate in the political process. Of course the litmus test for this to happen 
had to be that African Americans repudiate the Republican party. This party, which in the 
minds of most South Carolina whites had corrupted and nearly ruined the state since 
1866, had championed the rights of the former slaves. While white Democrats appeared 
united in their hatred of the Radical Republican regimes of Reconstruction, their rule had 
ended in 1877 and now Hampton offered an olive branch, of sorts, to those whom he had 
reviled for over a decade. And most of Hampton’s Democratic allies supported the 
former general’s overtures since they expected that African Americans would have few 
alternatives. But some allies of the Hampton in 1876 disagreed. Thus former Confederate 
officers, Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary, had no patience for reconciliation with 
blacks. The battle for the state government, for the very integrity of a white South 
Carolina, in their minds, was to eliminate all opponents, white or black, making sure that 
the reviled Republicans, but most particularly political participation of all non-whites. 
Did Hampton believe his prestige and personal qualities strong enough that he could 
overcome such powerful hatreds or was his Columbia rhetoric just that, something to 
offer the opposition until he and his lieutenants could eliminate them completely from the 
political arena? This paper will review his motives and relations with people up to the 
election of 1876 and argue that perhaps there was a little of both.  But in the final analysis 
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Hampton represented white resurgence and retrenchment, and while he may have 
believed that former slaves could be a part of the political process, it was only on t
terms of Hampton and his white lieutenants. In their minds only whites had the ability
indeed the very right, to govern the state. But to find out what led Hampton to his 
redeemer leadership role in the crucial election of 1876, one must first review his 
background.
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politics. Although his grandfather had held prestigious military posts, first in the 
Revolution and later in the War of 1812, and his father also attained distinction in
latter war, the family focus was to attain land, slaves and wealth. By the time Wade, II
was born in 1818 he became part of one of the most privileged families in the American 
South. The Hampton family already controlled vast acreage in the South Carolina 
Midlands, owned hundreds of slaves, and made millions dollars from growing cott
They had few social or economic peers. Wade Hampton, III, was not just a wealthy son 
of a prominent family, but well educated and traveled, having attained a degree from 
South Carolina College and toured extensively in Europe and the Northeast during his
young adult life. Nonetheless his most important station in life was to become a 
successful plantation manager who would direct a vast estate of cotton lands from
great wealth would continue to be derived. In 1843 he began to manage the family 
plantation in Mississippi that included 12,000 acres and nearly one thousand enslav
workers. Between these holdings and those in the Midlands of South Carolina, Hampto
traveled regularly to manage both. His favorite activities, hunting and fishing, could also 
be assuaged in such endeavors. Like his father and grandfather, Wade, III, viewed 
politics as a secondary role in society that he reluctantly assumed. In 1852, for the f
time, Richland District constituents elected him to the South Carolina House of 
Representatives and, six years later, the same voters elevated him to the State Se
neither did he distinguish himself, rarely speaking while serving on legislative 
committees on Federal relations, agriculture, and redistricting. And not until his last ye
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in the antebellum legislature did he even speak out on major issues before the legislature. 
In short it seems that he served in the State House because his social position required it.2  
 
Such modest political ambitions began to change, as the rift between North and South 
grew more intense at the end of the 1850s. Hampton spoke out against John Brown’s raid 
on Harpers Ferry in fall, 1859, warning that if the North did not condemn the radical 
abolitionist the Union could not survive. Although he did not lead the charge, when 
Lincoln became the standard bearer as the Republican presidential nominee, the South 
Carolina planter supported plans for a secession convention if the Illinois lawyer were 
elected. He not only voiced his support for such a body but also joined the Minutemen, 
groups of men in many communities around the state that supported secession prior to the 
elections. Throughout the fall campaign season these groups held public demonstrations 
in their own regalia and wrote a manifesto supporting secession. In the wake of Lincoln's 
election victory, Hampton continued to support calling of a convention although he was 
not elected to that body. But when the state seceded, Hampton immediately offered his 
services to defend the newly independent "nation." But in the midst of the crisis, as South 
Carolina faced off against the federal government over the status of Fort Sumter at the 
mouth of Charleston harbor, Hampton saw fit to leave the state in March, 1861, to check 
his holdings in Mississippi. It was after his return to the Palmetto State two weeks after 
Sumter surrendered, that Hampton began to organize his now famous Legion. Not only 
its founder, the planter-turned-soldier became the Legions financier, using his vast wealth 
to pay for its soldiers’ uniforms, equipment, and firearms. By late spring the Confederate 
high command ordered Hampton’s Legion north to defend the newly anointed capitol in 
Richmond, Virginia.3 
 
Hampton’s many exploits as a military leader, first of his legendary Hampton Legion and 
then as cavalry commander, are well known. After the Confederate armies reorganized in 
spring, 1862, the Legion was split up and its commander became a subordinate under the 
renowned cavalry general, Jeb Stuart. Upon this legendary figure's death in May, 1864, 
Hampton's distinguished service and abilities led to his promotion as Stuart's successor as 
commander of all Confederate cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. During his long 
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and distinguished service, the South Carolinian received many wounds in daring attacks 
against federal cavalry and infantry from Manassas and Gettysburg to Petersburg. In the 
last months of the war Hampton went home in a doomed attempt to stop William T. 
Sherman’s march through the Carolinas. Loyal and determined to war's end, Hampton’s 
resilience seems more tragic because of his own personal losses. First his brother, Frank, 
fell mortally wounded at Brandy Station in June, 1863. Then more than a year later, one 
of his sons, Preston, was killed in an engagement near Petersburg.  To compound these 
tragic deaths, at the war's end Hampton's family home at Millwood, just outside 
Columbia, was burned to the ground by Sherman’s troops. Likewise his holdings in 
Mississippi, including three steam cotton gins and 4,700 bales of cotton were lost. 
Perhaps Hampton’s greatest capital loss, however, was the more than one-thousand 
enslaved workers who now were free. The state’s most distinguished Confederate 
military commander, in spite of all his dedication to the Southern cause, found himself 
virtually destitute financially, if not emotionally.4 Despite his best efforts Hampton could 
only recover a small portion of his holdings following his declared bankruptcy in 1868. 
 
In the midst of such personal and capital losses Hampton was slow to accept the new 
social and political order dawning on post-war South Carolina. Although he rejected 
immigration to South America or Europe that some of his former Confederate comrades 
had done, he was slow to reconcile himself to the Confederacy's demise. In summer, 
1866, he told his former commander in chief, Robert Lee, that, “I am not reconstructed 
yet…” and declared to his former commander-in-chief that, “Time will prove that you 
have not fought in vain.” While such attitudes are understandable it is clear that Hampton 
would not easily concede that four years of bloodshed and personal loss had been a 
national and personal waste.5 
 
As the defeated Confederate tried to cope with his own personal loss, the political and 
economic changes occurring within his state became more alarming. For a brief period it 
appeared that former Confederates would be able resume the reigns of power with the 
blessings of President Andrew Johnson. But a Republican Congress soon refused to 
accept Johnson's lenient terms for the former Confederacy and reversed Presidential 
 5
Reconstruction with a series of laws in 1866. Instead they imposed severe restrictions on 
most of the old leadership and required the Southern States to accept former slaves as 
equals on the political and social arenas for the first time. This was an affront, if not 
worse, to most whites such as Hampton. And they soon showed their opposition. 
 
Hampton expressed this bitterness to President Andrew Johnson in greater detail. He 
denounced what he perceived as a vindictive Congress that was led by Radical 
Republicans who usurped their authority and ignored the constitution by forcing the 
Southern states to adopt the 13th and 14th amendments without due deliberation of its 
respected leaders. To Hampton the amendments were forced upon the South illegally. 
Somehow Hampton could not accept that Congress responded to thwack the South 
Carolina legislature who the previous year passed a series of “Black Codes” that severely 
restricted the movement of freedmen and, essentially, returned them to a life of servitude, 
which they had recently left. Nor could Hampton see the purpose of what he called a 
corrupt Freedmen’s Bureau and “a horde of barbarians- your brutal negro troops” that 
imposed law and order in the South. Such organizations were an effrontery to whites, but 
especially to former slaveholders who had had virtual life and death mastery over blacks 
barely a year before. Such a response was natural for men like Hampton who had grown 
up and been taught that only they had the ability, the right, to govern the affairs of their 
state. Now that former slaves were free men who Congress had given political rights, 
Hampton could not fathom such a monolithic shift in social position, even if his beloved 
South was defeated.6 
 
His bitterness slowly waned in the following months but Hampton remained true to his 
upbringing as a planter and former slaveholder. Even though he advocated limited 
political rights for freedmen he advised his white friends that they could still control the 
state legislature by controlling the black vote. Like planters of the antebellum era, 
Hampton and most of his class could not conceive that former slaves had the ability to 
behave rationally in the political arena. In a sense former slaveholders believed, 
metaphorically, that freedmen were still imbued with secondary status as they had been in 
slavery. African Americans needed people like Hampton to instruct and “prevent” them 
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from harming themselves. Such a conclusion came from a paternalistic, racist assumption 
that blacks were unable to think for themselves or realize their own best interest. By 1867 
he told James Connor, a fellow Confederate veteran of South Carolina, that it was the 
duty of "every Southern man" to secure the "good will and confidence of the negro." But 
it was acceptable to send blacks to Congress since Hampton considered that they could be 
trusted more than "renegade[s] or Yankees." In conclusion he advised that  "respectable 
negroes" should be recruited. Presumably this meant freedmen that whites knew could be 
relied upon, whether by bribery or intimidation, to accept and serve Southern whites in a 
loyal, ie. subordinate manner.7 
 
The assumptions of Hampton and his associates were sorely tested during the following 
decade as the battle with Republican rule in the state ebbed and flowed. First, most white 
voters tried to forestall the election of delegates to a new  state constitution convention 
mandated by Congress. Since the federal body mandated that a majority of the state 
registered electorate had to ratify the call of such a convention, the large number of white 
voters that registered never caste their ballots on election day in November 1867. Despite 
this unity, the vast majority of registered black voters (85%), who voted for such a body, 
were enough to validate the elections for the Constitutional convention that met two 
months later. Not surprisingly its majority of black delegates drafted a new constitution 
that ushered in tax and land reform, the first formal public education system and more. 
Nonetheless the former cavalry leader continued to believe that whites could influence 
enough freedmen so that Democratic conservatives could control the legislature when the 
next round of fall elections occurred. But Hampton's assumptions proved false. The 
Radical Republicans won a significant majority and began to implement their reform 
agenda- including raising taxes, implementing land redistribution, and installing a grass 
roots public education system. These bold moves threatened white conservatives who 
feared losing control of black labor and political control to a Republican party with 
majority black support. It was the intention of most whites leaders that they had to 
prevent this and take back the reigns of power to forestall political and social chaos. 
Although some whites, even Hampton for a time, advocated some peaceful 
accommodation with the Republicans, most believed that only intimidation and violence 
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against the other side could resurrect white control. Former Confederates such as Martin 
Gary and Mathew C. Butler argued the dire nature of this new struggle as an attempt to 
place the “negro over the white man” in which Republicans were “at war with the noblest 
instincts of our [white] race.” To whites, who tried to reach an accommodation by 
political means with former slaves, conservative radicals such as Butler believed they 
were badly misled, if not traitors to their race. Butler and his supporters, known as 
“straight outs,” began a campaign of intimidation and violence to attain victory for 
conservative Democrats. Such violence ranged from beatings to murder, one of the more 
extreme cases being the assassination of a black leader, Benjamin Randolph. In October 
1868, while campaigning for a seat in the legislature in Abbeville, several shots rang out 
in the local train station killing him instantly. Yet even in this violent atmosphere blacks 
and their white allies went to the polls in November and elected a radical ticket.8 
 
Hampton could not legally run for political office because Congress barred high ranking 
Confederate officers from public service, yet his work behind the scenes was not impeded 
by the Republican victory of November 1868. Since his prediction that whites could 
control the black vote failed he seemed to discard his hope in that arena. Instead Hampton 
tacitly supported the Klan violence that accelerated in the wake of the 1868 elections. 
Primarily in the upstate bands of vigilantes, often clad in frightening regalia, intimidated 
and attacked Republican supporters, white and black, with impunity. Unable to end the 
violence, the Republican governor, Robert K. Scott, appealed to the President and 
Congress for federal troops to help stem the carnage. When the President invoked the 
Third Enforcement Act, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, in April 1871, 
Federal troops soon arrested several hundred-suspected Klansman. Even though Hampton 
publicly spoke out against the violence, he nonetheless led a subscription effort on behalf 
of the accused for their legal defense. Although at least one historian has called the 
federal law timid, that it should have been imposed earlier and more forcefully, the action 
ended most of the violence. Hundreds were incarcerated and trials were held. 
Unfortunately for the federal authorities so many suspects turned themselves in, along 
with those captured, that the courts and jails could not process the huge backlog that it 
created in the justice system. This, coupled with the expert defenses that the accused 
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received through the moral support and the financial backing of people such as Hampton 
and Mathew C. Butler, only a token number of accused Klansmen received convictions. 
And those that did generally received light prison sentences. Even though the violence 
came to an end, it proved only temporary. As the elections of fall, 1876, began in earnest 
white conservative elements re-ignited their campaign of intimidation and violence. And 
this time Hampton led the effort by running for governor.9 
 
Although former Confederates at all levels were given amnesty by Congress in 1872 
Hampton had remained too preoccupied with personal family issues and his poor finances 
to take a leadership role in the fight against the Radical Republicans. His efforts to 
improve his finances collapsed when the insurance company he joined went into 
bankruptcy less than a year after his appointment to its board. Nevertheless he still had a 
keen interest in the political future of his home state. Thus when old Confederate leaders 
approached him in June 1876 to be the Democratic Party's nomination for governor he 
accepted.10 
 
Hampton’s social position and heroic role as a Confederate leader during the war made 
him the best standard bearer for the conservative Democrats. Unanimously nominated in 
an August convention, the soldier-turned-politician started a campaign across the state, 
from the upcountry to the lowcountry, defending the virtues of his party and castigating 
the corrupt and spendthrift ways of the Radical Republicans. But Hampton's speeches and 
his obvious public appeal as a hero of the defeated Confederacy was possible largely 
because of the political army- mounted Red Shirts- that bolstered his appeal and 
protected him in every community he took his campaign. From Anderson, Sumter, 
Winnsboro and Yorkville during the fall campaign Hampton was met by an impressive 
entourage of local dignitaries, admiring young ladies and scores, sometimes hundreds, of 
mounted Red Shirts. For one campaign rally in Winnsboro on 16 October 1876, an 
elaborate itinerary was created and fliers posted throughout the community. It outlined 
where the local Democratic dignitaries were to stand, the place of "colored clubs" and 
how the "mounted men" arraigned themselves so that "colored people of both parties" 
could be admitted in front of them. In Yorkville a grand parade met Hampton at the train 
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station and turned out for the Democratic nominee’s stump speech where he appealed not 
only to whites but also blacks. After castigating the corrupt Republicans in Columbia and 
their governor, Daniel Chamberlain, for the umpteenth time he appealed for black 
support. Ironically Hampton claimed that blacks had become “slaves to your political 
masters” and that to be “freemen they must leave the Loyal League” and join with him to 
bring “free speech, free ballot, a free press.” And yet just a decade before most blacks 
had been slaves for life to Hampton and his class devoid of any right whatsoever.  Fear 
prevented many minority voters to assert the courage to openly disagree with Red Shirts 
ready to pounce on any dissenters in the crowd. Except in the lowcountry, where blacks 
outnumbered whites, few of these grand political rallies allowed the opposition to rebut 
Hampton’s claims.11  
 
In spite of Hampton’s appeals on the stump and his professed opposition to campaign 
violence, his Red Shirt supporters ruthlessly used intimidation and violence throughout 
the upstate to suppress Republican opposition. One Laurens County Republican group 
appealed to Governor Chamberlain for protection because no one “dares to speak nor act 
with respect of his franchise privileges without being in extreme danger.”  Individual acts 
of violence sometimes expanded into major battles that led to injury and death on a large 
scale. Just as the campaign began in earnest, the Ellenton riots of September 1876 saw 
black militia carry on a running battle with Red Shirt companies for almost two days 
before federal troops intervened to end the carnage. At least 50 blacks and one white Red 
Shirt lay dead at its conclusion. Similarly at Cainhoy, in the low country, blacks and 
whites faced off again. Here the black militia got the better of the action but still whites 
inflicted nearly as many casualties on the Republicans before they fled. With such brutal 
violence going on all around him Hampton seemed to remain above the fray, arguing 
before black audiences why they should support his election. Through an alliance with 
the whites, he argued, "who owned the land . . . pay the taxes . . ." blacks could redeem 
the state “together." But, he warned, if they continued with their "carpet-bag friends (the 
Republicans)" they would lose aid or support when needed, presumably from whites.12  
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Some former slaves seem to take Hampton’s words to heart because as Edmund Drago 
shows in his recent study, the white Red Shirt clubs had black allies. According to this 
historian there were at least eighteen black Democratic Clubs organized during the 1876 
political campaign. How many of these clubs actually were formed by political coercion 
from whites or from genuine disillusionment by blacks with the Republican leadership is 
difficult to determine. Evidence gathered by Drago suggests that these black 
organizations had members that joined for a variety of reasons, some from conviction, 
others out of necessity.  Some African Americans felt that even if the Democrats were not 
their best political allies they did not think that the Republican party could protect them. 
Consequently in order to continue to continue living and working in their communities 
some former slaves believed they needed to gain favors from white Democrats that would 
protect and sustain them duirng and after the elections.2 
 
Even though Black Red Shirts did exist it is clear that most African Americans remained 
loyal to the Republican party despite the growing divisions within its ranks during the 
election campaign. And for those minority voters that  switched their allegiance most 
faced severe rebuke from fellow blacks, including their wives. Within most black 
communities such betrayal often led to expulsion from their household, and sometimes, 
even physical assaults. Nonetheless white intimidation by the Red Shirts and their allies 
was far greater. Even so the results at the polls were very close when the November 
ballots were tallied. Although the conservative Democrats had a lead of just over one 
thousand votes across the state, this was initially nullified by the vote count in Laurens 
and Edgefield Counties. In these two districts county commissioners reported voter fraud 
where Democrats received more votes than actual voters available. This began the long 
stalemate over who had won the election. For the next several months Republicans and 
Deomcrats claimed victory.13 
 
In spite of this stalemate Hampton declared himself the winner. He demanded that his 
Republican opponent step down. Backed by Federal troops Chamberlain refused, almost 
leading to a bloody riot during the last days of November 1876 as both Republican and 
Democratic legislators declared victory for themselves and proceeded to occupy the same 
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chamber in the South Carolina State House.  Led by duel speakers, E.W.M. Mackey for 
the Republicans and William H. Wallace for the Democrats, a tense atmosphere 
continued for four days with both sides refusing to leave the chambers. Surrounded by 
Federal troops, on the morning of the fourth day the Democrats reluctantly voted to leave 
voluntarily when the troops outside seemed poised to remove them by force. However, as 
this occurred, disgruntled whites had begun to arrive in Columbia from many areas of the 
state to gather around the still unfinished State House, seemingly bent on throwing out 
the Republican members regardless of the federal troops. Before violence could break out 
Hampton showed his true leadership. Going before the mob he requested that the mob 
disperse. As they did so the authority of Hampton was obvious and the legitimacy of the 
Republican governor and his party compromised irrevocably.14 
 
Yet while Chamberlain tried to hang on with the aid of federal troops and Congressional 
backing, Hampton had enough public support to have himself inaugurate governor even 
though he lacked legal authority. In December 1876 Hampton declared in his acceptance 
speech that he owed much of his success to black voters who “rose above prejudice of 
race and honest enough to throw off the shackles of party.” Yet even though Hampton 
publicly claimed this support, others in his own party realized that it was the Red Shirt 
bands, with their intimidation tactics and recourse to violence, had really “won” the 
election for him. On election day in one Lexington precinct a Democratic observer 
admitted that only ten blacks voted the conservative ticket. Although it is difficult to say 
how many blacks actually voted Democratic across the state one historian estimates that 
probably no more than 100 blacks in each county voted for Hampton and his party.15  
 
Nonetheless, even without substantial black support, Hampton eventually forced his 
Republican rival to resign his office. As he and Chamberlain disputed each other's 
legitimacy into the spring of 1877, the hopes of Republicans that somehow the Radicals 
ticket could still win grew ever dimmer. Hampton and his Red Shirts advised its 
supporters to pay taxes to the Democracy, not Columbia, so that the Republican regime 
could not operate the daily duties of government. In fact, the power of the conservative 
democracy had grown so that just before Chamberlain resigned his office in April 1877 
 12
Hampton reputedly claimed that if the former governor had not given up his office he 
would have had every tax collector in the state hanged. But the final chapter in 
Republican rule only ended after Hampton visited the President in Washington. There, 
after he assured the newly inaugurated Rutherford B. Hayes that he would guarantee 
political rights and protection to blacks as well as whites, regardless of party, the 
President agreed to pull out all remaining federal troops from the state. With federal 
protection now gone Chamberlain had no other recourse but resign his office and leave 
the state.16  
 
With Hampton and the Democrats finally undisputed victors the former cavalry hero 
continued to claim that he regarded both races as equals before the law and that African 
Americans should enjoy the same political rights and protections as whites. Perhaps the 
Redeemer governor truly believed this but some, if not most, of his lieutenants did not. 
Men such as Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary, just as they had directed the Red Shirt 
campaign, proclaimed the elections of 1876 as a campaign in which “Southern Society . . 
. will not have these people [blacks] rule over us.” Or as another Red shirt leader and 
future governor of the state, Ben Tillman, put it when looking back at that pivotal year- it 
was a battle between “civilization” (white) and “barbarism” (black).17 
 
Whether Hampton considered that racial dominance was the essence of the struggle or 
not, it’s obvious that he viewed blacks as second-class citizens who could only participate 
in politics under white supervision. Old Confederates such as MC Butler were 
determined to eradicate black political participation, regardless of who might supervise 
black voters. Although Butler’s extreme position to remove African Americans from the 
State House, and eradicate those in local offices as well, failed in the early post- 
Reconstruction era, over time black political participation was steadily eroded. And it 
started within months of Hampton assuming undisputed office in spring 1877. In 
Richland County Senator Beverly Nash and State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan Wright 
were forced to resign their offices by the fall of 1877 after trumped up charges of 
corruption and drunkenness were brought against them. By the early 1880s most black 
politicians resigned even if they weren’t directly threatened once they realized how 
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tenuous their own position in the white-dominated government had become. But a few 
African Americans held onto their offices through the 1880s because they came from 
predominately black counties. Yet even the few who clung to political office had little but 
symbolic impact on policy. By the 1890s white supremacy would be complete and 
remained so for nearly a century.18 
 
As for Hampton his political leadership continued to have impact through the 1878 
election. He worked to improve funding for the budding public education system created 
by the Republicans and expenditures per pupil continued to rise for both blacks and 
whites through the decade of the 1880s under those who succeeded Hampton. But while 
Hampton’s legacy for equal education appeared genuine, that for equality in the political 
process never did. Constitutional offices during the Hampton years became all white. 
With legal means that excluded more African American voters from exercising their 
rights at the ballot box, the former general’s party lieutenants found ways to stuff ballots 
and restricted minority voters through literacy tests and grandfather clauses. And while 
Hampton oversaw new voting rights restriction he did little to support the few remaining 
African Americans in local offices, even if they were Democrats. The few that gained 
local offices did not keep them long after Hampton left to become US Senator in 1879.19 
  
In 1878 Hampton was elected to a second term as governor but plans were already afoot 
to send him to Washington where his influence on state politics would be minimized. 
Although the war hero’s prestige as a redeemer leader would survive as a symbol of 
white supremacy over the hated Radical Regime, his power on the political stage was no 
longer essential to white political dominance. Now over sixty Hampton’s age was 
probably affecting his ability while there were younger leaders, and some former 
Confederates, who were ready to take over the reigns of real political control. In late 
1878, following a serious hunting accident, Hampton’s very survival seemed precarious. 
The conservative regime that Hampton had returned to power in 1877 continued to 
maintain political control through most of the 1880s but their days were numbered as Ben 
Tillman’s star began to rise.  Even though the hero and leader of the 1876 election 
survived his accident and continued his political career in Washington for another decade 
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Hampton became largely a symbol of the old guard who influence on state politics was 
steadily eroded. While respected by most of his colleagues in the US Congress 
Hampton’s tenure had little significance for the state or the nation. He rarely spoke to the 
assembled body and often missed sessions because of illness or infirmity.   By the end of 
the 1880s even his symbolic value to the state’s young Turks, led by Tillman, was done. 
At the end of the decade the State Senate voted him out of office.20  
 
Hampton lived for another decade struggling to support his family while attending 
Confederate Reunions inside and outside the state when his health permitted. When he 
died in April 1902 he was praised for his determination and bravery as a soldier who did 
all in his power to protect his state during four years of war. There is no denying that he 
was one of the last of the old cavaliers who fought ferociously for his state, but his 
political leadership during and after Reconstruction is not so clear. While Hampton 
continued to fight for his state he did so from the perspective of an old guard trying to 
return the state to some semblance of its pre-war days. Steeped in the old white planter 
class where blacks and most whites accepted the planter oligarch without question, 
Hampton envisioned an ordered world, as he perceived it had been before secession. 
Although he opposed violence after Appomattox, he still acquiesced in the Red Shirt 
campaign of 1876. Even though he continued to claim that he had garnered a significant 
number of black votes to win back the state in 1876, most white supporters from that 
election later admitted that Hampton was misled. According Ben Tillman, reflecting on 
these events years later, despite Hampton's claim that he had won 16,000 votes from 
black constituents in 1876, “… every active worker in the cause knew that in this he was 
woefully mistaken.”  A noble soldier, Wade Hampton was at best a resolute but 
reactionary politician. While willing to accept blacks in the political arena it could only 
be on white terms. Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Hampton accepted white methods 
of intimidation and violence to save the state from what he and other white leaders 
considered chaos under a black dominated Republican Party. He, like most whites, 
believed that the best options for all, blacks and whites, was a paternalistic society that 
controlled the economic and political course of the state. To Hampton equitable 
distribution of political power and economic freedom for recently freed slaves was a 
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recipe for disaster. His philosophy and upbringing made his political career one of 
reaction and retrenchment.21  
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